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Abstract: Analyzing the financial benefit of marketing is still a critical topic for both practitioners 
and researchers. Companies consider marketing costs as a type of investment and expect this in-
vestment to be returned to the company in the form of profit. On the other hand, companies adopt 
different innovative strategies to increase their value. Therefore, this study aims to test the impact 
of marketing investment on firm value and systematic risk. To do so, data related to four Arabic 
emerging markets during the period 2010–2019 are considered, and firm share price and beta share 
are considered to measure firm value and systematic risk, respectively. Since a firm’s ownership 
concentration is a determinant factor in firm value and systematic risk, this variable is considered a 
moderated variable in the relationship between marketing investment and firm value and system-
atic risk. The findings of the study, using panel data regression, indicate that increasing investment 
in marketing has a positive effect on the firm value valuation model. It is also found that the own-
ership concentration variable has a reinforcing role in the relationship between marketing invest-
ment and firm value. It is also disclosed that it moderates the systematic risk aligned with the mon-
itoring impact of controlling shareholders. This study provides a logical combination of govern-
ance–marketing dimensions to interpret performance indicators in the capital market. 
Keywords: marketing; investment; emerging markets; firm value; systematic risk; share value; own-
ership concentration; social science; open innovation; complexity 
 
1. Introduction 
In terms of performance appraisal and impact assessment strategies, marketing has 
undergone fundamental changes beyond product-market measures—i.e., market share 
and sales growth—and addresses capital market measures, such as firm value and share 
stock return elements [1,2]. Accordingly, based on integration and overlap among eco-
nomic fields, competition between companies in the product market stretches to the cap-
ital market, in the sense that the higher a company’s position in the market, the better its 
performance in the capital market [3]. Likewise, the product-market demand leads to a 
difference in the prospective returns in the capital market with regard to the competition; 
all strategic and operating actions of the company interact directly or indirectly with its 
market value [4]. Additionally, competition is mainly connected to marketing, as the most 
common competition tool in business, by creating competitive advantages to persuade 
potential customers to choose the company’s products or services without other alterna-
tives available in the market [5]; increasingly, marketing has become more inclined to in-
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novation to overcome challenges and protect stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, marketing 
activities have become the major driver of a company’s performance in terms of tradi-
tional performance characteristics and improving the returns of shareholders [6]. In the 
same manner, marketing efforts reflect a long-term investment for a company that may 
directly bring financial benefits (such as returns and profitability) and indirectly bring 
marketing benefits (such as customer satisfaction). In turn, such benefits implicitly help 
to explain market value [7]. As a result of the growing importance of marketing in organ-
izations, many scholars have endeavored to explain the financial impact of marketing 
strategies through the relationship between marketing efforts and company performance 
in the capital market [8,9]. 
The previous interdisciplinary literature ultimately falls under the marketing–fi-
nance interface, as a new scientific approach deals with the joint impact of the financial 
and non-financial elements embodied in the firm’s value. In other words, marketers have 
begun to adopt a vision that considers the financial aspects of marketing strategies in or-
der to contribute to achieving the original firm goal of maximizing the owners’ wealth 
[10]. However, the current radical changes in marketing synchronize with a significant 
development in the capital market concept, which becomes the essential criteria of the 
firm performance in the framework of maximizing shareholder value—in other words, 
transferring value to investors [11]. Hence, the capital market metrics used by researchers 
to measure the effect of marketing listed firm performance, chiefly share price, as a pri-
mary expression of market value and systematic risk, which lies at the core of portfolio 
theory through the linkage between the performance of the company’s stock and the per-
formance of the overall market portfolio in harmony with the market-based asset creation 
framework, where the investment in marketing leads to generating some intangible as-
sets, such as brand equity and customer equity, which in turn play a significant role in 
firm value enhancement and relevant risk lowering, depending on cash flow features [12]. 
Marketing practices accelerate cash flows, which increases the value and supports the sta-
bility of revenues—that is, it reduces fluctuations in cash flow and thus reduces risks 
[13,14]. On the other hand, the various marketing efforts send a clear signal to the capital 
market, which has a fundamental influence on the investor’s response and decisions to-
wards the company’s shares, especially the share price and its liquidity level, which reaf-
firms the long-term nature of marketing investment [15]. Furthermore, the success of mar-
keting in achieving satisfactory financial outputs in relation to firm value depends, to a 
large extent, on the degree of financial constraints, which explains the difference between 
countries regarding the marketing–firm value relationship [16]. 
It is found that most of the relevant empirical studies were performed on developed 
market frameworks, and most of them also focused on assessing the impact of marketing 
variables on financial variables using common evaluation models. In this context, by using 
a sample of the highly trading companies in some Arab emerging markets for the period 
between 2010 and 2019, the current research aims to analyze the impact of marketing on 
the capital market—particularly on two metrics. The first is the firm value by proposing a 
firm valuation model, which involves a marketing investment variable as a complemen-
tary element of accounting for published numbers, while the second is analyzing the re-
lationship of systematic risk and marketing investment controlled by size, age, and finan-
cial leverage. In addition to testing the moderating role of ownership concentration, which 
adds a governance dimension to the proposed models, meaning that current research is 
trying to answer the question of to what extent ownership can increase the validity and 
predictive power of the evaluation model, this provides new evidence for the literature 
related to the marketing–finance interface in the framework of emerging markets. Addi-
tionally, research findings show that marketing applications could play a significant role 
in leveraging value and rationalizing investment decisions in emerging markets, on the 
one hand, and in risk reduction, on the other hand. This, in turn, can be a key element to 
increase the efficiency of these markets and motivate investors, which leads to a greater 
contribution to economic development.  
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The rest of this paper includes the relative literature about the relationship between 
marketing and performance measured in capital marketing. In the next section, the meth-
odology, the sample and data procedures, and the formulation of the proposed model are 
provided. Ultimately, the statistical results are displayed with a discussion. 
2. Research Background 
2.1. Marketing, Firm Value, and Systematic Risk 
Ref. [17] analyzed the trend of corporate cost for 50 years from 1945 to 1995; their 
results revealed that all elements belonging to manufacturing costs dropped from 30% to 
50% as a percentage of total corporate costs; the administrative costs contribution dropped 
from 30% to 20%; while the trend of marketing costs was reversed, rising from 20% to 50% 
of total costs over the five decades. Further, the marketing budget average equals 11.2% 
of the global revenue, ranging between 22% in the retail sector and 2.6% in the health and 
pharma sector [18]. 
The shift in marketing expenditure as a long-term investment is an obvious phenom-
enon in modern business. For example, published financial statements of Apple corpora-
tion show $933 million as the marketing expenses against $87.1 billion for the brand value 
items [19]. The research literature deals with marketing firm value through two paths of 
marketing variables; the first one focuses on marketing assets’ impact as an ultimate out-
come of marketing investment, while the second one deals with the impacts of some mar-
keting actions/strategies as the initial inputs of marketing investment [20]. By analyzing a 
considerable set of empirical studies, ref. [21] concluded that both marketing assets and 
marketing actions have a clear elasticity through used capital market valuation models; it 
has been revealed that the elasticity of marketing assets is higher than that from advertis-
ing from the marketing actions perspective. 
Regarding the impact of marketing assets, brand equity has attracted great interest 
from researchers, and early attempts to explain the role of a brand were concentrated on 
its link with the future firm [22]. Relying on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) val-
uation model, ref. [23] shows that a high brand value portfolio benefits from a higher level 
of return and lower level of risk compared to other companies listed and the market return 
average in the Turkish market, which was confirmed in Latin American markets where 
companies included in a valuable brand finance list have a lower risk level and higher 
return level when compared with their counterparts not on the list [24]. In the Arabic 
emerging market, [25] shows that brands enhance their share return and have an informa-
tive contain to motivate market response.  
On the other hand, in the developed markets framework companies with a high 
brand capital investment and high brand investment per employee gain higher returns 
[26]. In this regard, the research team concluded that brand value correlates positively to 
return parameters and negatively to both systemic and idiosyncratic risk embedded on 
CAPM factors [27]. Furthermore, a high brand value could lower the negative impact of 
market crises such as the global financial crisis of 2008 [28]. 
Moreover, within marketing assets’ collection customer equity has received a high 
level of priority in marketing, since the customer is the core of business strategies. Simi-
larly, customer equity as an intangible market asset provided a reasonable proxy for firm 
value and was characterized as an appropriate approach regardless of the firm lifecycle 
period, especially during the growth peak or times of negative profit, where the tradi-
tional financial models could not be applied smoothly [29]. As well as customer satisfac-
tion, customer loyalty became an efficient measure of companies’ strategic success as well 
as a measure of the financial outputs of marketing [30]. In the same manner, customer 
measurements such as the Customer Satisfaction Index correlate positively with a firm 
value from one hand and reduce the cost of capital on the other hand [31]. Customer sat-
isfaction information presents a reliable signal to motivate the investor’s response to the 
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company; for example, when Dell’s customer satisfaction score went down in August 2005 
by 6.3%, the share price dropped by 12.5% [32].  
The second part of marketing investment involves marketing actions, which have 
been interpreted by scholars in the framework of capital market performance. Initially, 
advertising action is the perceptible part of marketing. It is clear and visible to the audi-
ence, and most of the advertising spending information of listed companies is available in 
popular databases [10]. Thus, a large body of research has addressed the impact of adver-
tising on firm valuation criteria and related risk in the capital market, where an increase 
in advertising spending leads to less systematic risk and improved financial health [2,33]. 
Similarly, advertising intensity leads to a low degree of implied cost of capital [34]; this is 
because of the increase in investors’ familiarity level with the company, which in turn 
leads to a higher level of liquidity and return [35]. Additionally, advertising communica-
tion could be an important resource to support investment decisions by providing a clear 
signal to the company, allowing it to price its products properly and at the same time 
informing investors about the right value of shares [36]; thus, investors choose stocks with 
higher advertising, therefore making it possible that the behavior of the investor could be 
modified by advertising communication [15]. 
In addition to advertising, new product introduction is considered the most influen-
tial marketing action on firm value. Introducing a new product is a major outcome of 
adopting an innovation approach through monitoring and transferring market feedback 
into actionable inputs to develop the current product or introduce a new one in light of 
perceived customer needs, ensuring the stable revenue of the firm or reducing the likeli-
hood of risk [37]. This enhances the long-term value of the firm as a result of the investor’s 
reaction to new available information, which intensifies over time [38], while irregularity 
in the product introducing process has a negative impact on the firm’s value [39]. Initially, 
a new innovative product explains and motivates the firm’s value growth compared with 
imitative products, leading to a lower level of value growth as measured by the Tobin Q 
TQ ratio [40]. This extends to a new product announcement, which leads to significant 
abnormal return, since the announcing of a new product would boost the attractiveness 
of a firm’s traded shares [41]. 
It is worth mentioning that Beta, as a matrix of systematic risk, despite the fact that it 
is considered a basic portion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), is also an agreed-
upon tool to build an efficient investment portfolio [33]. Besides this, it has been used as 
a common proxy for the cost of capital in a lot of previous empirical research [2]. Based 
on what is mentioned above, marketing variables influence capital market metrics, so it is 
expected that the relationship can be applied in Arab emerging markets. Thus, the first 
two hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypotheses 1 (H1). Marketing investment has a positive significant impact on firm value. 
Hypotheses 2 (H2). Marketing investment has a negative significant impact on firm systematic 
risk. 
2.2. The Role of Ownership 
Joint stock ownership structure differs from other corporate legal forms by the nature 
of ownership, especially in terms of the owner rights as well as its link to capital market 
mechanisms. Inherently, ownership structure is associated with agency theory, where 
some conflicts are produced, such as owner–manager conflict and controlling-noncontrol-
ling owner conflict [42]. The implications of the ownership disparity between sharehold-
ers are formed in two directions; the first is monitoring impact, which involves the ability 
of large shareholders to control managers’ decisions and thus reduce the possibility of 
managers harming the interests of shareholders or engaging in opportunistic behavior. 
The second direction is the expropriation impact, which involves the negative aspect of 
large shareholder–minority shareholder conflict, assuming that controlling shareholders 
act in their interest regardless of other owners’ interests by transforming recurses and cash 
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flow for their private benefit, which is known as the tunneling phenomenon. In other 
words, ownership structure is a vital pillar of the corporate governance system [43,44]. 
Prior studies have dealt with the relationship of firm performance in the capital market 
and many ownership structure aspects, such as managerial ownership, institutional own-
ership, bank ownership, and family ownership. It must be noted that studies that have 
dealt with the direct relationship of marketing elements and ownership are rare in previ-
ous literature, except for [35], who concluded that advertising expenditure contributes to 
an increase in the number of shareholders and thus a high ownership dispersal. 
In relation to positive monitoring impact, a plethora of research proves this impact 
empirically. In [45], the authors conclude on the positive effect of concentrated ownership 
in terms of firm value based on controlling and minority owners’ convergence of interest 
in the Spanish market. Along the same line, [46] showed that funder-controlled companies 
perform better in the market than non-funder-controlled companies in China, where fun-
der-concentrated ownership motivates investors by being a firewall for the company from 
their point of view. Additionally, the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder and 
the largest three shareholders correlate positively with firm value in Romania [47]. 
On the other hand, other studies have reemphasized the negative expropriation im-
pact. In [48], the authors demonstrated that more increased control that is not coupled 
with good cash flows led to lower market value during the Asian crisis. The author of [49] 
tested the relationship between ownership concentration measured by individually con-
trolling shareholders’ percentages and institutionally controlling shareholders and firm 
value; he found that both measures push down the firm value in Switzerland. Likewise, 
the expropriation impact of ownership concentration in the Korean market deepens the 
negative R&D–firm value relationship because of controlling shareholders hindering 
R&D investment decisions [50]. Meanwhile, a third line of research revealed no clear link 
between ownership concentration and firm performance; the authors of [51] reported that 
a high level of control by family or state shareholders in Arab Gulf listed companies did 
not show a significant impact of ownership on the market to book ratio. 
Concerning the systematic risk–ownership nexus, in the light of conflict of roles for 
different segments of shareholders, the existence of several controlling shareholders in-
creases the market firm risk, while a single controlling shareholder contributes signifi-
cantly to risk reduction in the USA [52]. It was shown that companies controlled by share-
holders who own diversified portfolios tend to take more risks compared with others con-
trolled by non-diversified shareholders in Europe. The same effect was proven in the 
banking industry, where the controlling shareholders push toward risky decisions to in-
crease their wealth. On the contrary, ref. [53] documented that the ownership concentra-
tion has no impact on market risk, as measured by unexpected volatility, and perfor-
mance, as measured by the TQ ratio, in Vietnam. 
In essence, the variation in the results of ownership impact on value and risk is due 
to the characteristics of the country or region being studied regarding the level of regula-
tory institution development in relation to governance framework in general and partic-
ularly the degree of investor protection. 
Consequently, the third and fourth hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypotheses 3 (H3). Ownership concentration moderates the relationship between marketing in-
vestment and firm value. 
Hypotheses 4 (H4). Ownership concentration moderates the relationship between marketing in-
vestment and firm systematic risk.  
The conceptual model of the study is formed according to the literature and the hy-
potheses. This model is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of research. 
3. Methodology 
Data and Model Formation 
Four markets were selected (Qatar, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait) based on them hav-
ing similar economic and social circumstances as well as similar financial market struc-
tures. In the next step, the listed companies within the constituents of the Financial Times 
Emerging Markets Index (FTSEEMI) are identified; they include 44 companies. Specific 
characteristics were applied to determine the final sample regarding the available finan-
cial statements from 2010 to 2019; the companies had a clear product with alternatives in 
the market and positive book values during the study period. After dropping financial-
sector companies, 20 companies (200 observations) were accepted in the final sample, as 
shown in Table 1, which is based on an adaptation from FTSE Russell (2020). The sample 
companies present the most-traded listed companies in the markets under study by 
weight at 1.85% of the FTSE Emerging Markets Index (FTSEEMI). 
Table 1. Sample of research. 
Variable Qatar Dubai Abu Dhabi Kuwait Total 
Market listed companies 43 68 70 216 397 
FTSEEMI constituents 19 8 7 10 44 
Weight in FTSEEMI 1.14% 0.43% 0.5% 0.93% 3% 
Final sample 10 3 3 4 20 
Sample weight in FTSEEMI 0.9% 0.21% 0.31% 0.43% 1.85% 
Market cap USD B 14.4 7.4 8.5 8.1 38.4 
Furthermore, we used secondary data of fundamental financial figures and data re-
lated to sharing the price of sample companies extracted from the Thomson Reuters Re-
finitiv DataStream as well as from the official websites of markets and companies in the 
case of missing data. 
The current research adopts Ohlson (1995) as one of the most critical residual earn-
ings-based valuation models which was published in 1995; some refinements were ap-
plied later [54–57]. Substantially, the model has gained considerable attention among re-
lated research due to its logical assumptions and mathematical structure depending on 
accounting figures. Additionally, one of the most essential advantages of the model is that 
the firm value is independent of the accounting choices effect. 
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According to Ohlson (1995), normal earnings are equal to the book value at the pre-
vious year t − 1 multiplied by the cost of capital; for that, abnormal earnings are the output 
of subtracting normal earnings from actual earnings, as in Equation (1): 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1, (1) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = abnormal earnings for period t; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = earnings per share for period t; r = risk-
free return; 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1 = book value for period t − 1.  
The model assumes the time series behavior of abnormal earnings through a linear 
information dynamic, which is considered the most important contribution of the model, 
as it created a link between current information and intrinsic value according to Equation 
(2): 
Pt= 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎
 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡, (2) 
where Pt = market value of share for period t; 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = book value for period t; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = abnor-
mal earnings per share for period t, which presented in (1); 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = information other than 
accounting information. 
According to Ohlson (1995), the valuation model expressed in (2) concludes that the 
abnormal earnings are produced by the company’s monopoly position in the product 
market and that the returns tend towards the cost of capital in the long run due to the 
competition level. On the other hand, 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 demonstrates that other information determines 
the price more than accounting information; in other words, other elements could play a 
significant role in investor decisions. This assumption is harmonious with the marketing 
firm value research stream in connection with additional information provided by mar-
keting variables to accounting numbers to forecast stock prices [22,31]. Accordingly, cur-
rent research uses the marketing investment as a proxy for other information in the model 
which is measured by marketing expenses, calculated as the selling and general adminis-
trative expenses (SG&A) minus R&D expenses [58–60]. Due to the role of marketing as a 
long-term investment, marketing expenses are divided by total sales: 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = [(SG&A − R&D)]/Sales. (3) 
Otherwise, marketing investment variables obtain a comprehensive proxy that takes 
into account all marketing applications in both marketing assets and marketing actions. 
Therefore, the main model is presented in Equation (4): 
Pt= 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, (4) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = marketing investment for the period t; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = abnormal earnings for the 
period t.  
The Ohlson 1995 model provides a logical framework of market value–residual earn-
ing linkage on the one hand and takes the other valuable resources into account on the 
other hand, particularly the goodwill role in value creation [61], which is in line with the 
concept of intangible marketing assets as a supplement to the accounting information of 
tangible assets, which could be an adequate measure to narrow the obvious variation be-
tween market value and disclosed accounting information. Marketing efforts can add pre-
dictive power to the valuation model in parallel with abnormal earnings, particularly ex-
plaining the gap between the market and book value through creating intangible market-
ing assets which provide a convenient explication of observations related to market value. 
On the other hand, to show the individual differences among sample companies, some 
control variables have been added to the model—namely, company age, as measured by the 
number of years since establishment, since older companies will have more accumulated 
intangible assets. The second control variable is company size, as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the end of the period. Finally, financial leverage has been added 
to the model, measured by the total equity to total assets ratio to control the effect of the 
financial structure of the sample; thus, the direct impact of the model is presented in Equa-
tion (5): 
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𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑎𝑎4Size + 𝑎𝑎5Lev + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡. (5) 
According to the ownership concentration as a moderating variable, following the 
relative studies concentration calculated by the controlling the shareholders’ total owner-
ship percentage on 31st December, the controlling ownership threshold is calculated 
based on 5% of voting rights [52]. The moderating impact demonstrated in Equation (6) 
requires generating a new variable for the interaction between the interpreted variable 
Marin and the moderating variable OW [62]. 
Pt =  𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3 Age + 𝑎𝑎4Size + 𝑎𝑎5Lev + 𝑎𝑎6OW + 𝑎𝑎7OW* Marin + 𝜀𝜀ti, (6) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = share book value; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = abnormal earnings for the period t; 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = market-
ing investment for the period t; Age = firm age; Size = natural logarithm of total assets; 
Lev = financial leverage; OW = ownership concentration.  
On the other hand, this research aims to explain the impact of marketing investment 
on the related risk of capital market through the systematic risk factor, which is calculated 
along the lines of related literature [33] based on regression estimation between the equal-
weighted monthly return of share and market index using a moving five-year window 
(60 months or at least 48) Therefore, this research proposes the model in Equation (7) for 
the risk–marketing investment relationship:  
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  = 𝑐𝑐1𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐3Size + 𝑐𝑐4Lev +𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 (7) 
In the same manner, the moderating impact of ownership concentration is demon-
strated in Equation (8) with the proposed control variables: 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  = 𝑐𝑐1𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐3Size + 𝑐𝑐4Lev + 𝑐𝑐5OW + 𝑐𝑐6OW * Marin + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, (8) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = systematic risk factor; 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = marketing investment for the period t; Age 
= firm age; Size = natural logarithm of total assets; Lev = financial leverage; OW = owner-
ship concentration. The definition of the variables is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Definition of research variables. 
Variable Description  Recourse  
Share price  Annual closing price. Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Book value B 
Book value in 31st December, equity/outstanding 
share number. Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Abnormal earnings X 
Earnings per share less the normal earning 
𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1  
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1,  
where 𝑟𝑟 = risk-free return measured by the 
yield of government bonds for ten years. 








Total ownership percentage of the controlling 
shareholders (5% of voting right). Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Size Ln (total assets). Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Age Number of years from establishment. Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Financial leverage Lev Total equity/total assets. Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Systematic risk Bet 
Systematic risk factor calculated by using a mov-
ing five-year window (60 months or at least 48) 
through regression estimation between the 
monthly return of the share and the market in-
dex  
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡= slop (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 ). 
Own calculation based on Thomson 
Reuters DataStream 
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4. Results 
In this session, the statistical results are displayed to test the research hypotheses, 
starting from some descriptive statistics, then using panel data regression steps to test the 
relationship between marketing investment, firm value, and systematic risk in the mar-
kets under study. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 includes the mean, standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values 
of sample companies. The minimum price within the sample companies was $0.32, where 
the share has been traded at a level close to the par value ($0.27), while the maximum 
price was $6.04 with a mean at $1.70; also, the book value ranges between $0.07 and $2.78, 
with an average of $1.28, which indicates a good level of retained earnings and hence a 
greater margin of safety, supporting the stability of the company’s financial position. Re-
garding abnormal earnings X, the main is close to 11%, while the range of portfolio be-
tween −40 and 42% could be an acceptable level of performance measured by operational 
profit. With respect to marketing investment, the average for marketing expenditure was 
close to 25% of sales, within a range between 0.001 and 43%. The age of the portfolio com-
panies ranges between 13 and 62 years, with an average of 19.68 years, which reflects the 
relatively short history of the sample companies as an extension of the economic and fi-
nancial structure of countries under study; this is also relatively recent compared to other 
regions of the world. With respect to the systematic risk measured by beta, the average of 
the sample portfolio was 0.89, meaning that the return of the companies under study de-
pends on the market return by 89%, with a maximum value at 240%. Furthermore, the 
ownership concentration average is 44% in a range from 22% and 90%, which reflects a 
high level of concentration. Finally, the market to book ratio ranges between 0.47 and 2.45 
times with an average at 2.24, which exceeds the global average at 1.7 and that of emerging 
markets at 1.3 [63]; this refers to the value created by intangible asset investment, partic-
ularly marketing assets. 
Table 3. Descriptive statics of the sample.  
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
P 200 0.32 6.04 1.7080 1.2252 
B 200 0.07 2.78 1.2874 1.6355 
X 200 −0.400 0.4201 0.1094 0.1606 
Marin 200 0.001 0.4324 0.2491 0.1565 
Age 200 3.00 62.00 19.6834 17.730 
Total Assets USD M  200 108 259,532 20,958 30,292 
Lev 200 0.0400 0.9100 0.5288 0.2062 
Bet 200 −0.38 2.41 0.8931 0.3373 
OW 200 0.22 0.90 0.4400 0.2213 
P/B 200 0.47 2,45 2.24 0.2949 
4.2. Correlation Test 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients of variables, where the relationship direc-
tion corresponds with the study hypothesis. Furthermore, the correlation outputs refer to 
a significant relationship between the first dependent variable P and the independent var-
iable value of Sig is less than 5% (p < 0.05), noting the full correlation of share price with 
abnormal earnings, which supports the Ohlson model’s assumption of a linear time series 
behavior. Similarly, the systematic risk Bet correlates inversely with most of the independ-
ent variables as well as with the market value presented by P. 
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Table 4. Variable correlation matrix. 
Probability P X2 B MAR BETA LEVR OW SIZ AGE 
P 1         -----         
X 
0.6359 1        
0.0000 -----        
Marin 
0.0359 0.0107 0.0258 1      
0.0145 0.8804 0.7172 -----      
Bet 
−0.4134 −0.3434 −0.3582 −0.2496 1     
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 -----     
Lev 
−0.0215 0.0281 0.0750 0.0314 -0.0570 1    
0.7634 0.6941 0.2926 0.6599 0.0239 -----    
OW 
0.2238 0.1118 0.1892 0.0543 −0.1890 −0.2140 1   
0.0015 0.1160 0.0074 0.4461 0.0075 0. 2400 -----   
Size 
−0.1187 −0.0474 0.0792 0.1054 0.2542 −0.3989 0.2468 1  
0.0949 0.5065 0.2660 0.1383 0.0003 0.0900 0.4004 -----  
Age 0.1638 0.0617 0.3315 −0.0724 −0.0196 0.2001 0.2157 0.3769 1 
0.0208 0.3870 0.0230 0.3095 0.0837 0.0046 0.0022 0.0701 ----- 
4.3. Model Estimation Procedure 
Due to the structure of the study data, a panel data analysis was conducted by run-
ning the model estimation to define the fit model, which reflects the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables depending on relative statistics. Firstly, heteroske-
dasticity checking was conducted to test the consistency of the residual error variance in 
variables data based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR). Hence, we used a white cross-section 
within the covariance method to control the adverse heteroskedasticity impact on the 
model estimation. The next step was the stationarity checking of the models’ variables by 
the Unit Root Test (URT); the stationarity is the initial term of model estimation to avoid 
the misleading regression of time series. URT was conducted using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) (1979), as in Table 5. 
Table 5. Stationarity URT test of variables. 
Variable Level 1 Difference  1 Difference Order 
P −7.1288 - - I(0) 
X −6.4318 - - I(0) 
Marin −8.0179 - - I(0) 
Age −3.8236 - - I(0) 
Size −1.8097 - - I(0) 
Lev −7.3267 - - I(0) 
Bet −1.7010 - - I(0) 
OW −8.0179 - - I(0) 
From Table 5, all the variables show stationarity in their level form I(0), where the 
prob value is less than 5%, meaning that the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected and all 
the variables are integrated on the level I(0) 
4.4. The Estimation of Marketing Investment Impact on Firm Value  
The panel data model estimation of firm value as a dependent variable including the 
variable coefficients and the related statistics of model significance are presented in Table 
6. After conducting the Hausman test (1978) to choose the appropriate method of model 
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estimation, the resulting prob value of Chi-Squared is less than 5%, so the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the fixed-effects method is fit to the research data. 
Table 6. Marketing investment and firm value: estimation results. 
Dependent: P Direct Model Moderating Model 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 0.8056 0.0000 0.8083 0.0030 
X 3.0205 0.0774 2.9186 0.0421 
Marin 0.0219 0.3843 0.1823 0.0452 
AGE 0.0145 0.0201 0.0118 0.0330 
Size −0.3376 0.0012 −0.3504 0.0014 
Lev −1.7540 0.0001 −1.3985 0.0003 
OW   0.1880 0.0005 
OW*Marin   0.1143 0.0328 
R-squared 0.4273  0.6047  
Table 6includes the fixed effects regression results of the Ohlson model with a white cross- section 
to avoid heteroskedasticity impact on share price as a dependent variable. We include marketing 
investment as a proxy for other information and control variables, as well as the moderating im-
pact of ownership concentration OW*Marin over the period 2010–2019. 
The table shows that the dependent variable is affected significantly by abnormal 
earnings and marketing investment is based on the prob value, which is less than 5%. The 
explanatory power is based on an R-squared value of 0.42, which means that the inde-
pendent variables explain 42% of the share price variance; on the other hand, the model 
is fit for estimation based on the F-statistic, which is less than 5%. Furthermore, the own-
ership concentration moderates the firm value–marketing investment relationship, where 
the prob value of the coefficient is less than 5% for both the OW variable and the interac-
tion variable OW*Marin, knowing that the explanatory power has increased significantly, 
moderating the model at 60%. This confirms the monitoring impact of controlling share-
holders on performance, supporting our first and second hypotheses. 
4.5. The Estimation of Marketing Investment Impact on Systematic Risk 
The result of the Hausman test (1978) indicates that the fixed-effects method is more 
suitable for risk model estimation (Chi-Squared Prop ≤ 5%); the estimation outputs of both 
direct and ownership moderating impact are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Marketing investment and systemic risk: estimation results. 
Dependent: Bet Direct Model Moderating Model 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C −0.8144 0.0213 −0.7271 0.0001 
Marin −0.1962 0.0000 −0.6494 0.0012 
AGE −0.0101 0.0012 −0.0098 0.0100 
SIZ 0.2043 0.0000 0.1881 0.0055 
LEVR 0.5588 0.0175 0.6956 0.0047 
OW   −0.2573 0.0310 
OW*Marin   −1.7233 0.0202 
R-squared 0.1933  0.3421  
Table 7 includes the fixed-effects regression results of the marketing investment impact on system-
atic risk Bet with a white cross-section to avoid heteroskedasticity impact and control variables, as 
well as the moderate impact of ownership concentration OW*Marin over the period 2010–2019. 
The table shows that marketing investment affects reversely the systemic risk Bet, 
meaning that the marketing investment expenditure is lower the related risk of the listed 
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company, which extends to all variables in the model except size and leverage, where the 
larger the company, the larger the level of associated risk that is a result of the high inte-
gration of sized firms into economic factors. Similarly, high financial leverage raises the 
level of exposure to risk due to debt service pressures. On the other hand, ownership con-
centration leads to a lower level of systemic risk, whereas dispersed ownership may in-
crease the potential for interest conflicts and thus exposure to external risks, especially 
when the block shareholders have long-term investment goals in maintaining relative sta-
bility at the price level and mitigating fluctuations. Moreover, the ownership variable 
moderates the impact of marketing investment on systemic risk based on the Prop value 
of the coefficient, which is less than 5% for both the OW variable and the interaction var-
iable OW*Marin. Otherwise, the ownership moderating role enhances the explanatory 
power of the model from 19% to 34%. This supports our third and fourth hypotheses. 
4.6. Robustness Test 
To ensure the robustness of our baseline findings, the two alternatives of marketing 
investment measures have been used in panel data regression to test the reliability of the 
statistical outputs in both the firm value and systematic models. Firstly, the marketing 
expenses to total assets ratio has been employed as a proxy of marketing investment; sec-
ond, the natural logarithm of marketing expenses has been used alternatively, as shown 
in Table 8, where the outputs of alternatives measures correspond to our basic results in 
relation to the marketing impact on firm value in the first part of the table, as well as the 
impact of marketing investment on systemic risks in the second part of the table, where 
the outputs of alternative measures confirm the direct impact of marketing investment on 
firm value as well as the moderating impact of ownership on the valuation model. This is 
extended regarding the reversed impact of marketing investment on systemic risk. 
Table 8. Marketing investment alternatives: estimation results. 
Dependent: P First Alternative Second Alternative 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 1.095751 0.0000 1.177912 0.0101 
X 1.553398 0.0005 1.177912 0.0000 
Marin (1) 1.224370 0.0000 0.105217 0.0351 
AGE −0.010499 0.0090 −0.003231 0.2122 
Size −0.055548 0.0007 −0.046980 0.0495 
Lev −0.186262 0.0764 −0.539324 0.0202 
OW 1.784478 0.0000 2.159767 0.0116 
OW*Marin −29.72153 0.0000 −0.345049 0.0038 
R-squared 0.361569    
Dependent: Bet First Alternative Second Alternative 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 0.0042 0.0001 0.00146 0.0014 
Marin (1) −0.035610 0.1734 0.000356 0.0173 
AGE −0.004720 0.0494 −0.004720 0.0494 
SIZ 0.139299 0.0000 0.139299 0.0000 
LEVR −0.002469 0.9848 −0.002469 0.9848 
OW −0.200487 0.3141 −0.200487 0.3141 
OW*Marin −0.001194 0.0071 −0.001194 0.0071 
R-squared 0.290261  0.271341  
Table 8 includes the fixed effects regression results of marketing investment alternatives impact on 
the firm value P and systematic risk Bet with white cross-section to avoid heteroskedasticity im-
pact and control variables, as well as the moderating impact of ownership concentration 
OW*Marin over the period 2010–2019. 
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5. Discussion: Marketing Investment, Firm Value, and Open Innovation 
5.1. Marketing Investment and Firm Value 
The insight of the marketing role in capital market indicators has turned into a new 
trend among researchers and practitioners. The research tries to demonstrate the impact 
of marketing on firm value in the emerging markets context, therefore the statistical re-
sults provide interesting insight into the role of marketing in shareholder value genera-
tion. The results are consistent with relevant literature regarding the positive relationship 
between marketing expenditure and financial performance, which in turn reemphasizes 
the growing importance of marketing strategies as a driver of performance enhancement 
[64]. Furthermore, firm value could be an inclusive metric to measure performance, since 
it involves many factors influencing both the internal and external environment of the 
business, and wealth maximizing is the goal on which all stakeholders agree [65]. 
The results provide new evidence about the reciprocal influence between product 
market and capital market, where the marketing activities are an efficient channel to trans-
fer the impact of product market elements such as customer reaction and competition 
level, which in turn translates to value in the capital market. 
From other side, the results confirm the reliability of the Ohlson model in firm value 
valuation depending on residual earning, meaning that the firm value of the sample port-
folio is a function of the share book value and abnormal earning, providing new evidence 
of the Ohlson model’s significance, where the firm value is inherently determined by the 
investor’s expectation about the firm’s future through comparing the accounting earnings 
with their investment costs [66]. At the same time, adding marketing variables as a proxy 
for other information factors enhances the valuation model’s power. That is, the market-
ing variable boosts the informative content of accounting figures—in other words, mar-
keting information plays a complementary role in stimulating investor response.  
The results are consistent with the role of market-based assets in value creation as an 
outcome of marketing investment, as reported by [12]. The positive effect on cash flows is 
presented by residual earnings in the proposed model as a logic channel to improve firm 
value, which could by a practical approach to interpreting the growing contribution of 
intangible assets as a pivot portion of firm value. This means that the markets under study 
evaluate the intangible marketing assets that lead to more excellent market value [67], and 
using marketing investment could be an efficient path by which to evaluate the intangible 
assets as a step forward to frame the numerical recognition of this type of asset. 
In relation to systemic risk, our findings indicate that increases in marketing invest-
ment lead to a lower level of systemic risk, in line with previous empirical research [2,33], 
and marketing investment-systematic risk reconciliation provide a deeper vision into the 
role of the non-financial factor in market reaction to firm shares, and thus the contribution 
to shareholders value creation that can be elucidated as marketing applications promotes 
firm value and lessens its linkage to market trend simultaneously through the inverse re-
lationship in the proposed model, in the sense that marketing investment helps relatively 
in highlighting the individual investment features of a firm’s share in isolation from the 
market movement.  
The ownership concentration plays a significant role in reinforcing the impact of mar-
keting investment on firm value that is aligned to a monitoring assumption where large 
owners use their voting power to curb the opportunistic behavior by motivating managers 
to make operational decisions aiming at increasing firm value and in turn increasing their 
fortunes [43]. In addition, the power of large shareholders can be extended to marketing 
decisions such as the adoption of strategies and agreed on budgets, knowing that the sam-
ple companies are characterized as concentrated in terms of ownership. Generally, the 
positive influence of concentrated shareholders on financial performance and particularly 
on capital market measures has been proven by a relative stream of studies [45,53,68]. On 
the other hand, our findings do not agree with those of prior studies of a positive owner-
ship–risk relationship, which is classified under the expropriation role of controlling 
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shareholders [52]. Therefore, based on our findings, this role of ownership can be dis-
cussed in terms of how the controlling shareholders contribute to mitigating the potential 
risk or systematic risk as a core element of a listed company, which could be a result of 
the nature of block shareholders in the market under study, as a strategic investor aims to 
maintenance their investment value at an acceptable return by avoiding high volatility in 
their portfolio price, especially in the case of state shareholders. The marketing–owner-
ship combination would add an operational dimension represented in the outputs of mar-
keting strategies and an administrative dimension as represented by ownership concen-
tration to provide a deeper and more comprehensive interpretation of the firm perfor-
mance and its value drivers. 
The findings indicate that marketing investment reduces the risk associated with the 
company’s capital market activities, especially in emerging markets that have higher risk 
due to economic and political uncertainty. Therefore, an efficient marketing investment 
company can ensure a more stable price of their financial assets in the capital market [24]. 
5.2. Marketing Investment and Open Innovation 
The marketing–finance interface is an operational reflection of open innovation and 
market complexity through its distinctive determinants. In this context, the new market-
ing approach is a focal point for promoting open innovation of the business; marketing 
could be a bridge to exchange the company’s internal knowledge with external parties as 
well as help build a relationship framework that allows the optimal investment of the 
company’s competitive advantages [69]. Further, marketing monitors the available infor-
mation in the market to use it for developing new products or services and contributes to 
rationalizing innovation strategies and ensuring the company’s competitive position. Par-
ticularly from the perspective of new product acceptance and adoption by the customer, 
where the customer prefers a product developed by an open innovation process which 
accelerates cash flow/revenue and reduces fluctuation/risk, this justifies the allocation of 
a portion of R&D budget to capture and develop ideas from outside resources [70]. 
Likewise, open innovation adoption can be an effective path for building marketing 
assets, especially by applying a modern arrangement such as a virtual brand community 
where customer groups play an outstanding role in brand image enhancement through 
interactive value co-creation. In other words, open innovation can be a driver in the value 
accumulation of intangible marketing assets. The effect mechanism of open innovation in 
a firm valuation workflow is illustrated by the integration of open innovation into the 
marketing value chain, which in turn activates the inherent organizational capacity of the 
business and contributes to increasing the effectiveness of the marketing investment to 
maximize the market value in order to meet the expectations of various stakeholders.  
6. Conclusions 
This study investigated the direct impact of marketing investment on firm value and 
systematic risk. The present study was conducted on the most traded companies in four 
Arabic emerging markets, and ownership concentration was considered as a moderating 
variable. The findings point to the positive effect of marketing investment on firm value 
through the promoting role of the ownership variable, while marketing investment has a 
negative effect on systematic risk. These findings contribute to the research literature on 
the framework of the marketing–finance interface. This study provides evidence about 
informative content marketing elements and developing the valuation model of the Ohl-
son model. Indeed, the study’s proposed model enriches the debate about the reliability 
of marketing actions and their role as a long-term investment in shareholders’ value. On 
the other hand, the results related to ownership concentration highlight the importance of 
ownership structure mechanisms in enhancing governance, particularly in emerging mar-
kets. This is why the governance increases the degree of marketing investment efficiency 
in market value creation. Capital markets, especially emerging markets, face high levels 
of risk due to economic and political uncertainty. The findings of the current study reveal 
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that marketing investments are able to reduce such risks in emerging markets. Thus, it is 
recommended that companies should think about effective investment in marketing be-
cause it will result in a more stable price for their assets in the capital market. 
For future research, by using the interdisciplinary methodology, more variables 
could be studied in the light of the marketing–firm valuation relationship, and consider-
ing other variables as a proxy for firm value or performance could enhance the analysis 
results, in addition to analyzing the potential applications of open innovation in leverag-
ing the marketing role in performance. Furthermore, other ownership structure elements 
could be analyzed to show their individual impact. Finally, the Arab markets are not deep 
enough in terms of the number of listed companies and the eligible companies for listing 
in the Emerging Markets Index, which has reduced the number of sample items. There-
fore, it is strongly recommended to conduct more empirical studies covering a larger num-
ber of listed companies. 
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